Pathankote Attacks Mystery

On 2 January 2016, a group of heavily armed militants attacked the Air Force station at Pathankote. The station is part of the Western Air Command of the Indian Air Force. According to the latest news updates on Tuesday, Firing could be heard from inside during Monday night and early Tuesday. A military official said a fifth militant was killed on the third day of the siege and at least one attacker remained in the complex, as troops worked to secure the sprawling compound. In an unrelated development, the United Jihad Council (UJC), a loose confederation of almost 15 militant outfits based in Pakistan controlled Kashmir (PcK), on Monday claimed responsibility for one of the deadliest militant attacks.

A cloud of controversy and a dubious aura hangs over the attacks from their inception. A Superintendent of Police (SP) was captured by the militants but later released. However, two of his fellow passengers were not spared. The militants then barged into the Air Force Station and engaged the forces for many hours. To repeat, the operation is still going even as it enters the fourth day. Logistically, operationally and from a military perspective, the stretching of the attack and the counter operation for four days seems bizarre and counter intuitive. Four days means 96 hours. Common sense suggests that it is impossible sustain an attack for 96 hours without logistical, operational and other forms of support. An attacker needs to eat to derive energy; he needs to sleep and he /they need constant and consistent replenishing of ammunition supplies to keep the forces continuously and consistently engaged. How can one or two militants manage dragging the operation/engagement for four days without food and ammo supplies? Moreover, while the initial momentum and element of surprise favours the attackers, with the passage of time, the forces can recoup, consolidate and with sophisticated technology pin point the attackers of those who survive the initial assault. Advantage then slips back to the attacked. How the attacker(s) survived so far is then a mystery.

Now having pointed out to the ‘improbability’ of a sustained attack, let us now turn to the politics of it.

It is obvious that whoever carried out the attack wants to derail and throw a spanner into the talks between India and Pakistan. But reverting to the prolonged nature of the attack, it would appear that whosoever is prolonging the attack is seeking both political and strategic benefits from it. Ultimately, the question is who gains and who loses from the attack?

Politically, the attack would render the Modi government on the back foot. If it is established that the attackers are from Pakistan and that their handlers were in some way or the other associated with the Pakistani state, Modi would find it hard or even impossible to sustain talks and dialogue with Pakistan. If, however, the Pakistani state’s complicity is not established, then things may turn out to be different. ‘Plausible deniability’ would allow Pakistan to wriggle out of the situation and the talks, while their timing could be impacted, may still hold. India, on its part may derive political mileage from the attack by attribution. It may establish the identity of the attackers as Pakistani and then given the alleged nature of the attacks gain accolades for ‘’restraint’. These reasons may account for the prolongation of the attack. All sides may be jockeying and positioning themselves to extract maximum leverage-political and strategic- from the attack. While this may be effective from a tactical point of view for any side involved, from a grand strategic perspective, it makes the Indo Pak relationship hostage to events. And events can, at times, be manufactures. This is not trotting out a conspiracy theory but adducing from the past from both a particular as well as a general conflictual landscape. Indo Pak dialogue is not an event; it is both a process and a condition that needs to be sustained despite hiccups and other issues. Sustaining this process warrants and requires statesmanship, patience and farsightedness. But a caveat is in order here: the whole process should be designed and structured in a way that includes and involves all stakeholders-including Kashmiris. Other- wise, events will overtake and overwhelm the process which, in turn, can metamorphose into something more insidious and dangerous like war. So let all parties and stakeholders construct a grand but grounded narrative over the conflict and chip away at it gently but forcefully till the whole architecture and edifice of the conflict breaks down. Talking about Kashmir would be a useful starting point. 

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