One Nation, One Election: A Flawed and Impractical Vision

By Aga Syed Muntazir Mehdi

On Tuesday, the government introduced a constitutional amendment bill in the Lok Sabha to synchronise national and state elections in India under the concept of ‘One Nation, One Election’ (ONOE).

To explore its feasibility, the government had established a committee led by former President Ram Nath Kovind to examine the scope of ONOE, the constitutional amendments required, and the steps to implement this vision.

While the concept may appear efficient at first glance, a closer examination reveals significant practical, logistical, and democratic concerns.

Supporters of ONOE argue that it will reduce the financial cost of conducting frequent elections, free political parties from a perpetual election mode, and allow them to focus on governance. These arguments, however, crumble under scrutiny.

When the numbers are analysed, the actual financial savings are minimal. Critics also point out that the real issue lies in the recent trend of national leaders and Delhi-based politicians devoting significant time and energy to state election campaigns.

If the concern is that frequent state elections hamper governance, the solution is simpler than synchronising elections: state elections should primarily be fought by state party units, while national leaders focus on governing the country.

Unfortunately, India’s increasingly centralised and presidential style of campaigning makes this solution unlikely.

Logistical and Constitutional Challenges

The logistical challenge of holding simultaneous elections across the entire country is staggering. Even state elections currently occur in multiple phases for security and administrative reasons. Coordinating both national and state elections would exacerbate these difficulties.

A more critical issue lies in the incompatibility of a rigid election schedule with the principles of parliamentary democracy. India’s constitution demands that a government must always enjoy the confidence of the House. If a government loses this confidence, it must resign and seek a fresh mandate.

While simultaneous elections were the norm in the 1950s, the system was disrupted when Article 356 was used to impose President’s Rule in states under exceptional circumstances. Synchronising elections today would require undermining this fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy.

Even if national and state elections are synchronised for one cycle, the system will collapse the moment a government falls prematurely. Two proposed solutions to this problem create more harm than good:

1. Imposing President’s Rule: If a state government falls, the state would remain under President’s Rule until the next synchronised election cycle, potentially for years. This undermines federalism and denies the people their right to elect a new government.

2. Shortened Assembly Terms: Fresh elections would be held in the affected state, but the new assembly would serve only until the next synchronised election. This creates instability and undermines the very justification for reducing election costs and campaigning fatigue.

These solutions also increase the likelihood of political manoeuvring to avoid the fall of a government, even if it has lost the House’s confidence. Despite the Tenth Schedule’s anti-defection provisions, ‘horse-trading’ has remained rampant, with politicians exploiting loopholes and judicial intervention to retain power.

ONOE also poses a fundamental threat to Indian federalism. Indian federalism is not just a matter of administrative convenience but a recognition of linguistic, cultural, and ethnic aspirations. State-level democracies allow regional issues, identities, and demands to be represented effectively.

Synchronising elections risks blurring these distinct arenas of democracy. State-level issues may be subsumed by national narratives, diluting regional voices. This undermines federalism’s role as a check on the concentration of power at the centre.

The federal structure, supported by the Rajya Sabha and plural democratic contests at the state level, prevents the centralisation of authority. ONOE risks eroding this balance and creating a system where power becomes dangerously concentrated.

Shrinking Democratic Participation

Elections are the primary means of public participation in India’s constitutional framework.

Unlike other constitutions that guarantee public participation in lawmaking or provide tools like the right to recall, the Indian system relies almost entirely on elections to hold representatives accountable. 

Frequent elections, therefore, allow for regular public engagement and debate. Simultaneous elections would shrink this space for participation without offering any alternative mechanisms to deepen democracy. The public’s ability to hold governments accountable would be reduced, weakening India’s democratic fabric.

In conclusion, the administrative benefits of ONOE are overstated at best and illusory at worst. Meanwhile, the costs are substantial, both in terms of implementation and the principles it compromises.

ONOE undermines federalism, weakens parliamentary democracy, and reduces opportunities for public participation.

The idea of ‘One Nation, One Election’ is fundamentally flawed, impractical, and carries significant risks to India’s democratic and federal structure. For these reasons, it is an idea that should remain in the realm of discussion, not implementation.

Views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the editorial stance of Kashmir Observer

The author is a constitutional lawyer and can be reached at [email protected]. Twitter/X: @agasyedmuntazir

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