Beyond Binaries

By Mubashir Bashir

The tectonic shift from rivalry to rapprochement could be a potential pathway to de-escalate and stabilize the war-torn region, argues the writer.

Sands quickly shift in West Asia. After forty-four years of a toxic relationship, the Iranians and Arabs are now dating each other. The regional heavyweights have decided to mend fences and begin a new chapter in their previously turbulent ties. On March 10, 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic relations after signing an agreement in Beijing. Midwifed by China, the deal is groundbreaking because it ended a seven-year deadlock.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have long vied for regional dominance. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Saudi rivalry has had catastrophic consequences for the West Asian region. The deadliest conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Bahrain have degenerated into intractable proxy wars—tearing these societies apart. Imperialist interventions have added fuel to the fire. Iran-Saudi escalations peaked in January 2016 when Saudi Arabia executed prominent Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr on “terrorism” charges (Nimr al-Nimr was a vocal critic of the Saudi government). Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran, prompting Saudi Arabia to downgrade its diplomatic ties with Iran. The Iran-Saudi agreement—with China as the matchmaker—expresses a ‘shared desire to resolve disagreements through dialogue and diplomacy,’ emphasizing respect for state sovereignty and “non-interference” in each other’s affairs. The deal—a diplomatic coup by China—can have a domino effect, promoting peace and cooperation among Persian Gulf nations and beyond.

Let me address the main point I raised in the title: the epistemic violence of the Shia-Sunni discourse. Western leaders, academia, the media, and think tanks often frame this conflict through a sectarian lens, casting the Iran-Saudi rivalry as an ethnic and sectarian dispute between Sunni Arabs and Shia Iranians or as a “clash of civilizations.” This understanding oversimplifies the complexity of the decades-long conflict. “Modern nationalism,” geopolitics, and geostrategic factors equally shape the rivalry (not religion per se) between the two political heavyweights. The Iran and Saudi Arabia discord “has nothing to do with the Sunni-Shia divide in Islamic theology.” The animosity between the two energy titans stems not from Islamic theology but from their shared quest for regional dominance (power projections), security, and survival.

Discourses unleash epistemic violence. By perpetuating these sectarian narratives, the West has further poisoned Iran-Saudi relations, leading to escalations. The dominant narrative amplified by Western media portrays an Islamic Iran that seeks to ‘export’ the Revolution. Such narratives ignore the pragmatism in Iran’s foreign policy. Those who view Islamic ideology as the primary determinant of Iran’s foreign policy fail to recognize the ideological flexibility embedded in both Islamic culture and the Shi’i tradition. The March 2023 agreement highlights the dominance of pragmatism over ideology, much like the 2015 nuclear deal Iran signed with the U.S. (the “Great Satan,” a sobriquet Iran uses for America). It demonstrates Iran’s capacity to prioritize pragmatism over ideology. 

The argument that the Shia-Sunni binary or a clash of ideologies makes rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia impossible is a distorted narrative. There is a historical precedent for Iran-U.S. détente. Since the 1990s, Iranian presidents have made similar diplomatic overtures to Saudi Arabia. In 1997, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz visited Tehran, leading to a bilateral cooperation and security agreement until 2005. The rapprochement peaked with Mohammad Khatami’s “Dialogue among Civilizations.” In May 1999, Khatami visited Riyadh, and King Fahd optimistically stated, “The doors have been opened to both countries.” Similarly, Hassan Rouhani’s foreign policy, guided by the discourse of “constructive engagement with the world,” sought to reinvigorate Iran’s relationships with the Persian Gulf neigbours. Rouhani’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, emphasized, “Our neighbors are our priority.” However, Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, which had the active support of Crown Prince Salman, hindered serious diplomacy with the Saudis. Late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s “Neighborhood Policy” encouraged dialogue with the Saudis, and Iran’s current President, Masoud Pezeshkian, recently visited Qatar and met with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan. Pezeshkian referred to the Islamic countries of the region as “brothers” and called for strengthened cooperation between the two nations. Crown Prince Salman is expected to visit Tehran at Iran’s invitation.

Not only ideology but pragmatism also shapes Iranian foreign policy thinking. “Cultural maturation” has led Iran’s foreign policy to shift increasingly away from religious ideology toward pragmatic calculations of national interest. The March 2023 agreement has undermined the axis of confrontation—the so-called 2020 Abraham Accords—designed to contain and isolate Iran. The nascent axis of brotherly nations of Iran and Saudi Arabia has become a countervailing force against the impending regional war triggered by Israel’s genocidal assaults on Gaza and Lebanon. The Iran-Saudi tension has had a ripple effect in the region. It has helped stabilize Yemen. Since October 2022, a truce supported by both Iran and Saudi Arabia has been in place in Yemen. It has rehabilitated Syria within the Arab world; Iran’s relations with the UAE, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait have all been restored. The thaw in Saudi-Iran relations has averted a major war between Iran and Israel, as the Persian Gulf nations have pledged not to allow Israel to use their “soil or airspace” to attack Iran.

This deal has the potential to transform the region. However, the odds remain high. The litmus test will be how both sides manage expectations, compartmentalize issues, and demonstrate ideological flexibility. Iran and Saudi Arabia need, in Huberman’s terms, an “empathetic understanding” (Verstehen)—a rational discourse to mitigate the conflict. Decoupling will be necessary: Riyadh cannot expect Iran to sever its links with the ‘Axis of Resistance,’ which Iran views as its forward-defense strategy against Israel and the U.S. Similarly, Iran must accept that the GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, cannot (and will not) end their security partnership with the U.S. Both must also commit to non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, as stipulated by the deal. This approach serves their larger national interests and is vital for the overall stability and security of the region.

Views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the editorial stance of Kashmir Observer

• The writer is based at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Feedback: [email protected]

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