By Dipak Kurmi
As the standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh persists, India maintains a firm position on the border dispute. National Security Adviser Ajit Doval recently underscored this stance during a discussion with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a BRICS NSA meeting. Doval stressed that achieving peace and upholding respect for the LAC are essential steps towards normalizing relations between India and China.
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has consistently reiterated India’s position during his discussions with his Chinese counterpart at recent meetings, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Kazakhstan and the ASEAN Plus gathering in Laos in July. Speaking at the Global Centre for Security Policy in Geneva a few days ago, Jaishankar noted that while negotiations are ongoing, approximately 75 percent of the disengagement issues along the LAC have been addressed. He emphasized that despite ongoing military tensions between the two nations, the broader bilateral relationship cannot remain unaffected by these conflicts.
The political leadership has clearly outlined the current situation, future expectations, and conditions necessary for peace. Like S. Jaishankar, Wang Yi, a seasoned career diplomat, has skillfully navigated delicate scenarios. However, Beijing’s approach has often been ambiguous, focusing on diplomatic niceties while the state-controlled Chinese media sometimes distorts the details of bilateral discussions to project a moral high ground. Although there are signs of progress in addressing issues in Ladakh, it is crucial to remain cautious when dealing with China.
China has a history of provoking conflicts, demonstrating military strength, and intimidating its neighbors, particularly those with claims in the South China Sea (SCS). Its diplomatic approach often involves bullying tactics, whether targeting Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, or the WHO. However, China may not have anticipated India’s firm stance in the ongoing border dispute. China’s difficulty in dominating the conflict with India has become a significant frustration. Beijing is likely intent on settling the LAC disputes on its own terms. Despite setbacks at Doklam in Bhutan and eastern Ladakh, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has adapted by encroaching upon Bhutan in the Chumbi valley and exploiting favorable terrain along the LAC in Ladakh.
Among China’s numerous security concerns, including the Taiwan issue and sovereignty disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, and other ASEAN nations in the South China Sea (SCS), the Himalayan border dispute with India stands out as particularly challenging due to India’s capability to effectively counter Chinese actions. While the disparity between India and China in terms of comprehensive national power—including military strength, technology, and economic prowess—often worries India, an armed conflict across the LAC remains an impractical option for China. As Prime Minister Modi remarked to Russia about “this not being an era of war,” this sentiment is equally relevant to Communist China. Instead, China will likely pursue incremental gains through border skirmishes while simultaneously promoting narratives of peace and engagement. This strategy allows China to maintain its contested claims and keeps India occupied to some extent.
India’s best course of action involves addressing the LAC in a comprehensive manner rather than approaching it in isolated segments. The establishment of theater commands, which has been under consideration for some time, is now beginning to take form.
Before the joint tri-services structure is fully realized, it is crucial for the Army to adopt a comprehensive strategy across its formations, spanning from eastern Arunachal to Ladakh. The challenging terrain in regions such as Kameng, Subansiri, and extending to the Lohit valley presents tactical advantages that can be leveraged by our forces.
The watershed in Sikkim, particularly in the eastern region overlooking the Chumbi Valley, is arguably the most strategically significant area from India’s perspective. Any challenges posed by the PLA in Ladakh or other regions should be met with a decisive display of strength in these advantageous locations, signaling our intent through clear, reciprocal measures. This strategy will only be successful if the LAC is viewed holistically rather than being analyzed in isolated sectors.
Aside from the tactical pre-emption demonstrated by our occupation of key positions on the Kailash Range, which forced the PLA to retreat, our response to Chinese maneuvers along the LAC has largely been reactive. Although the terrain along the LAC generally benefits the PLA by facilitating quicker troop deployments and logistical support due to superior infrastructure, the geographical disadvantages are mitigated by our determined military efforts, particularly in the eastern sector. Progress is being made in addressing the previously slow development of border infrastructure, overcoming the challenges posed by the terrain.
The Chinese are known for frequently shifting their demands and disregarding border peace agreements. They typically adopt an aggressive stance in disputes, using bullying tactics to intimidate their opponents. Despite this, the current Chinese leadership acknowledges and respects the resolve and strength of adversaries who stand firm. This respect for a steadfast opponent will influence their approach. Nevertheless, given the current geopolitical landscape and the interests of major powers, India may find itself largely on its own in confronting its northern neighbor.
India would benefit from taking a nuanced position on Tibet and Taiwan, while also becoming more vocal about the Uighur situation in Xinjiang.
Being proactive for us doesn’t mean being confrontational but rather anticipating and outmaneuvering China’s strategies through well-planned actions. It also requires maintaining credible deterrence capabilities to effectively counter China. Our approach should combine proactive diplomacy with the robust efforts of our military along the borders, defining our policy toward Beijing.
Views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the editorial stance of Kashmir Observer
- The writer can be reached at [email protected]
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