A quarter of a century after the Kargil war, the situation in Kashmir has come a long way. Although militancy survives in one or another form, so much else has altered, not just in Kashmir but also between India and Pakistan. For one, Kashmir street is now silent, sometimes eerily so. There are no longer any anti-New Delhi protests, hartals or stone-throwing. Separatist politics has been all but wound up. What is more, Jamaat-i-Islami is now raring to contest elections. It is true that these changes are more recent and came about following the revocation of J&K’s special status in August 2019, but Kargil war holds its own significance in the annals of decades-long Indo-Pak confrontation over Kashmir. It remains the last time Pakistan tried to wrest Kashmir directly by force but things didn’t work out according to the plan and it had to retreat within three months into the conflict.
General Parvez Musharraf, believed to be the architect of Kargil, took over Pakistan in a subsequent coup which deposed the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif. Although initially he maintained a tough stance on dialogue with India, seeking implementation of the United Nations Resolution on Kashmir, the general’s stance changed following 9/11. Overnight shift in the regional geo-strategic scenario forced him to explore pragmatic options for the settlement of disputes with New Delhi. He still made Kashmir a focal issue but was willing to give up his country’s historical position on the region for a negotiated settlement of the dispute. His four point proposals envisaged a solution where Kashmiris across LoC would have substantial autonomy in governing their respective parts of the state and be free to trade and travel without a radical change in the border between them. Where he went beyond the scope of autonomy and self rule was in calling for a joint management of Kashmir by India and Pakistan. What followed was a phase of perhaps the most promising engagement between the two countries, particularly the period through 2003-07, that saw the two countries coming tantalizingly close to pulling off an “out-of-box” Kashmir solution. But the lawyer’s agitation followed by Musharraf’s unexpected exit in 2008, put an end to this process. Mumbai attack followed in the same year, plunging the relations between the two to a new low.
It was actually Atal Bihari Vajpayee who had begun the promising negotiations with Musharraf, which were later followed up by Manmohan Singh. During this phase, Kashmir witnessed a progressive decline in militancy, an ironic about-turn from the architect of Kargil war. The militant killings went from 961 in 2004 to just 100 in 2013. What is more, it was during this period in 2002 that ceasefire was instituted along the Line of Control. And it was this truce that India and Pakistan re-affirmed in February 2021. In a sense, one feature of the current uneasy calm between the two neighbours harks back to that era.
However, a lot has happened since then. The dynamics that made the engagement possible at the time no longer exist. Several new factors are at play in the regional geo-politics and in the relations between the two countries that have made it increasingly difficult to go back to the formula.
The biggest change that has since taken place is the withdrawal of Article 370, which granted J&K its semi-autonomous position within the Indian Union, and the splitting of the former state into two union territories. This, from New Delhi’s point of view, has more or less ended Kashmir as an issue between India and Pakistan. India has now changed its goalpost. It seeks return of the part of Kashmir under the jurisdiction of Pakistan. And it is loath to even resume dialogue with Islamabad except on its own terms. And Pakistan’s response to this so far shows that the country is in no position to challenge India’s altered stance on Kashmir. While Islamabad may not have reconciled to the constitutional changes in the region it claims, the country has now kind of gotten used to the new state of affairs.
It is now difficult to believe that immediately after the Kargil war, when the peace process between India and Pakistan was in full gear, billboards featuring Musharraf and Manmohan Singh’s images were up all around Srinagar. Then it was seen as the right thing to do. Musharraf had made a dedicated effort to seek a lasting peace with India by finding what he then fondly called “out-of-box solution” to Kashmir. He sought to achieve this through unilateral flexibility – subsequently reciprocated by New Delhi – only to end up nowhere.
But in all other features, we have moved on from this time. Since then, Pakistan has become a weaker country and has also lost much of its bargaining power on Kashmir. And going by the words of its prime minister Shahbaz Sharif in 2022, Pakistan immediately after withdrawal of Article 370 was bargaining for a plan to freeze the Kashmir issue for 20 years, reportedly in lieu of trade with India. As for New Delhi, it has not given even a remote indication that it was ready for an engagement with Islamabad. Speaking in Kargil on Vijay Divas, prime minister Narendra Modi said that Pakistan had learnt nothing from history and continued to sponsor violence in Kashmir. As was expected, he offered no olive branch.
- Views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the editorial stance of Kashmir Observer
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