An ‘Indo-Russian’ Eurasia− The Deepening Of Strategic Cooperation

By Anuraag Khaund

The recent summit between Indian PM Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir on July 8-9 was a strong reiteration of the strong and strategic partnership between India and Russia which has survived the test of time since the Cold War era of 1971 (then USSR). This strength was evident in the Joint Statement of the 22^nd Indo- Russian Summit which not only described the ties as a ‘Privileged’ and ‘Strategic Partnership’ based on ‘trust, mutual understanding  and strategic convergence’ but also in the commitment to deepen partnerships in traditional areas of defence, military technical, space, nuclear, energy and trade and economic cooperation. However, for purposes of the article, noteworthy was the focus on transport & connectivity, Russian Far East and the Arctic as the sites of Indo- Russian cooperation which was identified in a separate Joint Statement as strategic areas of economic cooperation till 2030 by which the bilateral trade volume is aimed to be around 100 billion USD. 

 The geostrategic and geoeconomic values of the Russian Far East, Arctic and the connectivity projects such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chennai- Vladivostok Maritime Route have compelled both New Delhi and Moscow to accord it greater priority in the background of the geopolitical flux in Eurasia. A deepened cooperation in the latter spheres would allow a stronger Indo- Russian footprint in Eurasia in the face of increasing Chinese penetration in the region.

Eurasia is a geopolitical and geographical term referring to the combined landmasses of the Europe and Asian continents including its economic, political, and military resources. Eurasianism is the idea going back to 20^th century Russia which posits the latter not as a ‘periphery of Europe (West)’ but as the median power between the West and Asia (East) and its culture being the melting pot of both the Eastern and Western cultures. The idea also stipulates the regions of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia as falling within the Russian ‘Eurasian’ sphere of influence. In today’s time, the Eurasian identity has re-emerged in the backdrop of the Russia- Ukraine conflict since 2022. Aiding this shift in focus is Moscow’s ‘Pivot to Asia’  entailing deepened ties with Asian countries such as India and China among others. 

However, Russia’s pivot to and its no-limit partnership with China has generated some uneasiness among strategic circles in Moscow. This is in view of Beijing’s increasing economic and security penetration into Central Asia – a region regarded as falling under the Russian sphere− while Moscow’s position in the wider Eurasian region gets gradually reduced to that of a ‘junior partner’ to China. Also alarming from the Russian perspective is the growing influx of Chinese farmers and immigrants into the Far Eastern territories resulting in a demographic change in an area which has historically been the site of Sino- Russian border clashes and dispute going back to the Qing dynasty era of 1860. These concerns have also spilled over into the Arctic partnership between Moscow and Beijing with the former becoming wary of the latter’s ambitions in the resource rich region.

The above sets the stage for India in the Russian strategic calculus as a more reliable partner than China. Moreover, Moscow plays an indispensable role for New Delhi in the latter’s ambitions in the three areas of Eurasia, Far East and Arctic. 

Given India’s increasing focus on Central Asia and the Caucasus, the partnership with Russia− a longstanding traditional power in the two regions, is crucial and advantageous for New Delhi’s own ambitions. The importance of this partnership is especially evident in the Eurasian forum of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) where India joined as a full-fledged member in 2017 with Russian backing. Also important for the Indo- Russian Eurasian ambitions are the connectivity initiatives such as the INSTC and Chennai- Vladivostok or the Eastern Maritime Corridor. 

The INSTC refers to a multimodal transport and trade route involving rail, road and sea links spanning a length of 7200 km which was first envisioned in 2000 between India, Russia and Iran as an alternative route to connect the markets of Europe and Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan. The route again came to the limelight with the Indo- Iranian Agreement in Chabahar of May 2024 and the transportation of Russian Kuzbass coal to India via the INSTC from Kemerovo in Russia via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and Mumbai last month. However, the development of the above route has been challenged by the emergence of alternatives such as the Middle Corridor involving China as well as the latter’s alignment with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From the Russian and Iranian perspective, the Middle Corridor has been designed to bypass both Moscow and Tehran given the latter’s conflicted relations with the West while it would simultaneously deepen Chinese influence in the region much to the detriment of Russia and India. Hence, the operationalisation of the INSTC by the trio of New Delhi, Moscow and Tehran should take priority basis while also exploring other initiatives such as the Persian Black Sea Corridor involving the latter along with Armenia. In addition, the interest exhibited by Singapore in Chabahar should be banked upon to extend the INSTC to Southeast Asia. 

At the same time, the decision to open Indian consulates in Kazan and Yekaterinburg− two key Russian cities known as the centre of industrial production and international expos would allow Indian companies to showcase their talents and products to visiting Eurasian countries which might pave the way for robust cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in addition to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) being negotiated between the latter and New Delhi. It also helps that the members of the EAEU are also part of the INSTC which can open the pathway for synergizing.  

Another vital area for Indo- Russian Eurasian cooperation is the Russian Far East− an area rich in hydrocarbons and other resources such as coal and diamonds. Also important for India’s maritime ambitions is the port of Vladivostok which is the terminus of the Eastern Maritime Corridor with the other being Chennai. Hence, New Delhi has increased engagement with the region through forums such as the annual Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) while also expanding its role in areas such as shipbuilding, port infrastructure development as well as extending Line of Credit of 1 billion under India’s Act Far East Policy announced in 2019. A major asset for India’s Far East ambitions is its demographic dividend which could be utilized by Russia to tackle the growing Chinese immigration. 

Also  crucial for Indo- Russian interests is the Northern Sea Route (NSR) straddling the Arctic Ocean and Russia’s Far East all the way to Asia thereby reducing the time and distance between the two continents by 7000 km and less than two weeks. While India has rightly shown interest in exploiting this route, so has New Delhi’s rival China. Given the current instability of traditional routes such as the Red Sea as well as Chinese influence over the Houthis, the NSR controlled by Beijing would allow it to choke India’s energy supplies from both the sides. Hence, the need to strengthen Indian involvement in the NSR which was identified as a core interest area for the Indo- Russian Inter- Governmental Commission (IRIGC). At the same time, the linkage between the NSR and the Chennai- Vladivostok Route should also be explored which would allow both New Delhi and Moscow to engage with ASEAN countries bypassing China.

Related to the NSR is the Indo- Russian cooperation in the Arctic region− a strategic region near the Russian landmass which has seen increasing penetration by China as a ‘Near Arctic State’. The Polar Silk Road of the BRI is aimed at allowing Beijing to not only take advantage of the NSR and other potential sea routes of the Arctic as alternative energy shipping lines bypassing the ‘Malacca Dilemma’, but also the exploration and tapping of the potential hydrocarbon and other resources in the Arctic Shelf. Moreover, the increasing Chinese presence in Arctic states such as Greenland and Iceland is not something which can be ignored by Moscow. 

Hence, it has turned to India for cooperation in areas of mutual interest as shipbuilding, development of the NSR, exploration of resources and scientific research on climate change. Moreover, the presence of India could also offset or put to check the ambitions of China in the region. For India, its Arctic ambitions are best served by partnership with Russia which has the largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Arctic. It was this realisation that led to the Arctic along with the Far East featuring together among the strategic areas of cooperation in the Joint Statement. Given the proximity between the two regions, a strong Indo- Russian presence in the Far East would provide the base for more pronounced cooperation in the Arctic and vice-versa. This dynamic would inevitably involve the NSR which is fast becoming the new geopolitical hotspot in Eurasia.

Finally, a deepened partnership with Moscow might even nudge the Kremlin to check its tilt towards China− a major factor behind Modi’s outreach to Putin. For the West, the Modi- Putin Summit’s coincidence with the NATO Summit of 9-11 July in Washington was interpreted as Kremlin’s signalling of the latter’s failure at isolating Moscow. However, some have also opined the Indian engagement with Russia as beneficial to the West in checking the increasing converge between Moscow and Beijing− the rival of the US in the Cold War 2.0. The reverse is also true where New Delhi can act as the bridge between the West and Russia as the latter’s ‘all-weather friend’. At the same time, both the countries should also be mindful of Chinese attempts at playing spoilsport by misrepresenting the Indo- Russian relationship to the West which would be detrimental for both Moscow and New Delhi. Hence, the PM’s visit to Austria, a neutral state, immediately after the Summit was smart step aimed at countering such moves by Beijing’s propaganda machine. 

Let the spirit of Druhzba- Dosti (friendship in Russian and Hindi respectively) usher in an Indo- Russian led Eurasia. 

Views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the editorial stance of Kashmir Observer 

• Anuraag Khaund is pursuing PhD in International Politics (IP), School of International Studies (SIS), Central University of Gujarat (CUG). He can be reached at [email protected]

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