New Chinese Gray Zone Warfare Against India   

By Anuraag Khaund

The Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh grabbed headlines in the last few weeks over Chinese protestation against PM Modi’s visit to the state  on March 11 and again on March 25 in response to Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar rebuffing Beijing’s claims as ludicrous. Following closely on this recent tussle, Beijing on March 28 commemorated the ‘Democratic Reform Day’ in Xizang (Mandarin term for Tibet) which marked the 65^th anniversary of Tibet’s ‘liberation from earlier feudal serfdom’. What is of significance is that the above mentioned celebrations were held in the newly built Xiaokang (well-off) villages constructed along the borders of India and Bhutan. This action, in the light of recent events including the India- China border stand-off since 2020 and negotiations over settling the Sino- Bhutanese boundary (with implications for India), can be seen as a grey zone warfare tactic by Beijing.

Grey zone warfare broadly refers to the methods of indirect warfare or competition between nation states which lie in the area between peace and full-scale war. It includes a vast array of option such as economic coercion, blockade of vital supplies, cyberwarfare, disinformation, and narrative building and influencing campaigns. China is no stranger to such warfare given its pre-eminence in ancient  Sinic military treatises such as The Art of War  and the application of such tactics against India and Taiwan. 

With respect to the Chinese celebrations above, the first aspect to note is the location i.e. the Xiaokang villages. These villages, numbering around 628, have been built along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) straddling the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Indian territories of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh under the ostensible purpose of poverty alleviation and development in border areas; however, it is alleged that they are dual-use in nature and has been built with the purpose of stationing PLA troops and equipment. In addition to the LAC, these villages have also been constructed along the disputed Sino- Bhutan boundary in the backdrop of negotiations between Beijing and Thimphu. More worrying for India is the fact that such villages have also cropped up in the strategically sensitive Doklam tri-junction which has the potential implications for the Siliguri Corridor connecting the Indian mainland to its North-Eastern region. It is also to be underlined that Doklam is one of the main areas of dispute between Bhutan and China and of strategic importance for India which saw a tense 73 days standoff between New Delhi and Beijing in 2017. 

In terms of grey zone warfare, the celebrations in the villages situated along the above disputed areas were meant to substantiate China’s claims over the latter and in a way, normalise the occupancy of the same. Moreover, the celebration of the Democratic Reform Day provides an occasion for Beijing to highlight the ‘development and prosperity’ of these villages and thereby buttress its claims towards the seemingly non-military character and aims of the settlements.  At the same time, the timing of the celebrations immediately following the Chinese response to Indian to the rebuttal on Arunachal Pradesh are also aimed at reinforcing and reiterating Beijing’s claim over the region which it refers to as Zangnan or southern Tibet. In addition, the emphasis on ‘continuous, rapid development’ of the border as well as announcement of ‘promoting frontier prosperity, reinforcing border defence, border security, and the happiness of border residents’ can be seen as an apparent jibe aimed at recent Indian attempts at strengthening border infrastructure along the LAC including the  recently inaugurated all-weather Sela Tunnel reaching the strategic region of Tawang which drew the Chinese uneasiness on 9 March. Similar messages have also been conveyed through celebrations in villages to Bhutan and indirectly to India by holding events in villages at the Yadong county situated in the tri-junction. 

What should India do? 

Along with the current efforts at addressing the infrastructure deficit along the border, India should learn and adopt similar tactics of grey zone warfare. For starters, there should be frequent visits by the Prime Minister and other Central Ministers to Tawang− a region coveted by China both for its strategic location as well as its importance in Tibetan Buddhism. Such regular visits would help in reinforcing the already evident Indian sovereignty over not just Tawang, but the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. This would also serve as a corrective to the earlier administration’s stance of not undertaking frequent high-profile visits to Tawang during official tours of the state of Arunachal Pradesh due to apprehension over Chinese actions. Along with this, such high-level delegation including the PM should actively take part in the Statehood Day celebrations of Arunachal Pradesh on 20^th February every year to further buttress the above action. Along with the implementation of the Vibrant Village Programme aimed at bolstering the development of remote villages along the LAC, in a way similar to the Chinese celebrations, India too should regularly highlight the achievements and development of these areas to not only stem the migration from these areas but also counter Chinese attempts at psychological warfare. 

On the diplomatic front, India should use its current international weight and multiple partnerships to influence its partners to issue statements similar to the US reiterating Indian sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh while condemning baseless Chinese irridentist claims. In this regard, New Delhi can reach out to countries like Philippines whose sovereignty claims in the South China Sea (SCS) has been supported by India including calls to adhere to the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the same. Similarly, India can seek out other partners such as Japan and Vietnam to do the same in exchange for stronger support to their claims in the SCS and other benefits. 

Narrative constitutes a vital stratagem of grey zone warfare which China has never shied away from using. In response to its narrative of historical control over Xizang (Tibet) since time immemorial, India should invest its cultural resources in developing its own narrative highlighting the historical, religious and cultural links between Tibet and the Indian subcontinent as well as recognising the existence of separate Tibetan kingdom and culture militarily occupied and annexed by the People’s Republic of China in 1950. In addition, as a response to the commemoration of 28 March, the Government of India can participate in the official events organised by the Tibetan Government in Exile such as the annual anniversary of the Tibetan Uprising of 1959 on 10 March and unofficial presence during Tibetan Independence Day celebrations on 13 February, thereby highlighting the violent history of the Chinese occupation often brushed under the carpet. Moreover, the proposal of granting Bharat Ratna, India’s highest civilian award to His Holiness the 14^th Dalai Lama should also be considered along with allowing the latter to make frequent visits to the historic Tawang monastery− an important seat of Tibetan Buddhism which would also bolster the legacy and connection of India with the same. At the same time, as a rebuff to the usage of terms like Xizang and Zangnan, India should use the term Tibet to refer to the region and should even skilfully utilize the term ‘Indo-Tibetan border’ to refer to the LAC  in unofficial responses as done by certain quarters of the government in 2020.  Consideration should also be given to counter-measures such as re-naming places in Tibet as a signal of stronger Indian assertiveness.

With regard to Bhutan, while India has increased its outreach and level of support to the country, New Delhi also should also strive to increase the level of its commitment and re-assurance to backing Bhutan’s claims including supporting Thimphu’s voice in the international fora. Such strong support would not only help India’s own strategic concerns but also raise its standing in its near and extended neighbourhood as a trusted and reliable partner vis-a vis China. New Delhi should especially try to channelise robust assistance towards aiding Bhutan in developing its own border areas with China and its military capabilities. Such efforts would perhaps encourage Thimphu to emulate similar grey zone tactics as mentioned above on its own accord. 

As outlined by Dr S Jaishankar in his book Why Bharat Matters the crux of the positive development of the Sino- Indian ties lie in ‘three mutuals- mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests’. A cursory glance at the history of the ties since 1950 will show that while New Delhi has adhered to the three ‘mutuals’, Beijing has and continues to violate them till date. Hence, it is time, to employ the same tactics from China’s own playbook to make Beijing realise that ‘it would get as hard as it gives’ which should hopefully make it curtail its ambitions and exhibit responsible behaviour.  

• Views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the editorial stance of Kashmir Observer 
• Anuraag Khaund is pursuing PhD in International Politics (IP), School of International Studies (SIS), Central University of Gujarat (CUG)

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