There is no military solution in J&K

The most ineffective way of fighting your adversary in a hybrid conflict, like the one in Jammu & Kashmir, is to fight it only through the military route. This mostly ensures that you restore temporary order, but mayhem will soon return and often in your own presence.

The scope of hybrid conflict extends to multiple domains. Violence at different levels and different locations keeps the conflict relevant and visible while an adversary delves into other domains silently and effectively. Among these domains are promotion of radical ideology, creation of intense alienation, keeping the organs of government on tenterhooks and incapable of governing, intimidation of government agencies, media and private citizens, gun running and narcotics to sustain finances, and lastly and perhaps most importantly maintaining financial conduits for the unimpeded flow of money into the conflict system.

The invisible elements of hybrid conflict are far more dangerous than the seemingly more potent but largely visible elements such as cannon fodder terrorists. A common question which even some intellectuals ask me is – “why despite killing so many terrorists and losing so many soldiers, is little headway being made in J&K?” This is because, while keeping the army and police engaged in the fight against terrorists and stone throwers, there have been a range of activities taking place under the sponsorship and patronage of a host of other people.

The separatists have been projecting their cause through literature, social media, media patronage, mosque power, direct engagement and creation of structures which can be activated in minutes to respond to diverse situations. The campaign to radicalise Kashmiri society has been a deliberate ploy to empower the mosque and link Pakistan’s chosen path of radical Islam to the Valley’s new ideology.

None of us could stop it because of our intellectual inability to realise what was shaping up around us. In any case India’s security agencies were largely bereft of knowledge on religious ideology when radical Islamists across the border were planning and coordinating activities in the Valley with impunity.

None of the above can be done by separatists with the level of competence they have displayed without adequate financial backing, a truism for any such conflict. Islamic State could survive three years in northern Iraq because of looted finances from the Mosul treasury and revenues of taxation and the oil refinery. Once most of that was spent it was no longer possible to continue in the same mode.

It was, therefore, always a question of evolving our own strategy through ‘whole of government’ approach. Unfortunately the political class could not appreciate what its role was at the operational and strategic level. The problem was their perception that it was a conflict situation and therefore the responsibility of the security forces.

It was, therefore, always a question of evolving our own strategy through ‘whole of government’ approach. Unfortunately the political class could not appreciate what its role was at the operational and strategic level. The problem was their perception that it was a conflict situation and therefore the responsibility of the security forces.

The separatists have far better network and organisational structures than even the army. There are elements in every ‘qasba’ and every town, the intelligence providers, backed by an army of lawyers, treasurers, ideologues, rabble rousers, stone throwers, drug addicts and of course terrorists. All of them survive on the additional income provided by the separatists. There has been enough money coming in to finance a plethora of overground workers, compensate families of terrorists, pay guides at the LoC, safe house owners and stone throwers on an everyday basis.

Money came from foreign sources into legitimate accounts, cash was drawn by cards from accounts opened and existing in Delhi and even more cash was available through gift packets on Pakistan’s national day, at the Pakistan high commission.

With the situation in south Kashmir having drastically changed, the government has finally acted. It is good that both parties of the J&K coalition government have supported the NIA’s initiative with arrest of seven separatist leaders. Details of their financial networks are bound to produce enough incriminating material to ensure that the leadership is sufficiently ineffective for long. Care must be taken to prevent VIP facilities and availability of communications to the leaders, otherwise the entire gamut of operations may be compromised.

Next should be curtailing of mosque power, for which the effective advice of moderate Muslim clerics from rest of India should definitely make a difference. In the interim the army and other security forces must continue their excellent run to prevent the resurgence of gun power in the Valley. The ‘whole of government’ approach must continue.

The Article Frist Appeared In TOI

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