Kashmir: four possibilities

But why doesn’t India move on the lines of the probable solutions to the Kashmir problem? This has a lot to do with the reenergised India that thinks it can eliminate Kashmir as an issue between India and Pakistan with what are policy tools. 

There has been a lot of talk of the possibility of the dilution of Article 370 of the Indian constitution and the abolition of the special status of Kashmir opening the way to Kashmir’s inclusion into India as a regular territory enabling it to be governed by the same laws that govern the rest of India. Currently, as per the article India’s domain in Kashmir is only restricted to Defence, Foreign Affairs and Finance. How much of it is actually true is another matter; and whether Article 370 has now been reduced to only a skeleton can be a perpetual debate. But even if symbolic, tampering with Article 370 will constitute a strategic shift in India’s Kashmir policy.

A few speed-breakers are usually counted by those who wish to blink away the possibility of India’s resort to abolishing Article 370. One, the state assembly must – by a simple majority – recommend to the centre in Delhi to abrogate the article; Modi is currently engaged in an effort to muster that majority in the ongoing state elections in J&K. Called Mission 44, he may find himself just short and will be in need of a willing partner in a coalition willing to carry the burden. 

Two, even after such a resolution is recommended by the state assembly, Modi in the centre will need a two-thirds majority to cause the change in the constitution. He doesn’t yet have such majority; the Rajya Sabha still needs to be reformulated reflecting changes in the Lower House. This will come by at its own time.

Were Modi to even achieve majority on his own in Kashmir (unlikely), he will be slow to wring the changes. Many in India feel that an abrupt abrogation will only mean showing the match to tinder. That remains true in a state like Kashmir, heavily sensitised and invested with the commitment to their sense of destiny. However, a gradual weaning based around political and economic deliverance remains a potent possibility. 

We have got to remember: diluting the status of Kashmir will not be an instantaneous step, rather a series of deliberate small steps spread over a period of ten years under Modi (the next five are assumed – perhaps correctly) aimed at preparing grounds in Kashmir, in India, in the region especially with Pakistan, and in the world where such dilution will become a happily accepted fait accompli. 

The pain of this process of studied integration of Kashmir will be acutely felt in Kashmir and in Pakistan – as the two most affected parties to the issue. In Kashmir first: a combination of governance, delivery, raised stakes, compromising the more vocal voices through inducement of both political and economic benefit, and the usual arm-twisting and use of force where nothing else works will mean that there will be a gradual numbing of the sensitivity to this ultimate consequence resulting in the intended dilution. 

Add to it the gradual demographic moderation of the ‘others’ majority as well as a frequent interaction brought about by changes in laws that have prohibited non-residents to acquire property and land, as well as the travel through the Muslim-majority Valley for frequent religious pilgrimages paving way for a deliberately ingrained acquiescence of the other. This will be a socio-political plank of Modi’s strategy focusing on Kashmir.

For Pakistan, Modi’s policy on Kashmir will be a mix of many things. A deliberate denigration and distancing from Pakistan invoking our record with home-grown terror, especially Mumbai and Herat; a planned rebuff of any Pakistani attempt to resume dialogue on the model of the Composite Dialogue, since revoked unilaterally by India, and elevating the dialogue even in modified structures as a special favour to Pakistan by India; talks of punitive military measures aimed at retribution of Pakistan’s claimed excesses towards India; a denial of Kashmir as a possible subject of discussion between the two; and a host of red-lines now being popularly pronounced that Pakistan must adhere to, to establish its credentials of good behaviour to earn favour and respect from India. Trade, once an Indian obsession, is now a grant of goodwill by India, as is India’s benevolence in offering a handshake or even recognition of presence at international interactions with our political leadership.

These are tough times for South Asia, and Indian interlocutors of significant access in the Indian establishment never tire of mentioning to their Pakistani counterparts that it will never now be business as usual. Deciphered, it really means: ‘we decide how things move from here-on; and, you Pakistan will have to conform to a given code of behaviour to qualify for India’s attention’. At a recent gathering of such serious-minded representatives from both sides, after having discussed a host of issues that belabour relations, the Indian members of the meet refused to agree to include any aspect of the discussion on Kashmir in the joint resolution. Such disposition is becoming an established norm between India and Pakistan. What is implicit is always a strong undercurrent questioning even the need to discuss Kashmir. 

Cumulatively and in an integrated strategy, from a dispute Kashmir is being relegated to an issue, soon to be entirely diluted and then eliminated under a well-thought-out electoral, political and societal process. It will creep in slowly and create its own immunity to the changes that will keep getting manifested in the psyche of all partners to the process. How will, or should, Pakistan react to such slow inducement of acquiescence?

The following seems the more likely response by Pakistan, unless things really change at the top end: Pakistan will continue to be lured by the romance of improving relations with India as a long-held strategic dream of changing the paradigm in South Asia. Implicit in such desire is the drive that seeks to relegate the India factor in Pakistani military’s calculus, in turn removing the endowed eminence to the army as a saviour against such predominant threat. Both remain falsely premised. But while the play of attempting normalisation enacts itself according to the Indian design, Pakistan’s political and military establishment may simply be too slow to register the subtlety that may seem innocuous but will portent major reformation of the issues, especially on Kashmir. By holding Pakistan off, India is simply gaining the critical liberty of action ¬to implement the elements of policy that will accrue to it the desired policy objectives. Kashmir is heading that way.

The prognosis of a possible Pakistani response? If Pakistan’s political and diplomatic response is either wanting, or delayed, or non-existent, the inevitability of the dispute falling into the lap of the military to respond will be the only default eventuality. A military that may have waited earlier on the sidelines will be forced to react to an Indian ploy that may be far too advanced in implementation. 

Under unfavourable circumstances the army may be forced to find recourse in traditional responses. Will that mean 1989 all over again; or another skirmish or war? No one can tell. Indian cleverness with policy arrayed against Pakistani military may slide into another geopolitical degeneration with attendant consequences. Instead, political prudence through engagement and cooperative recourse to seek mutually beneficial resolution to the problem can bring us stability and peace in South Asia. It is time to bring in greater sincerity and avoid clever policy plays. The alternates are clearly disastrous.

Concluded

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